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1. Introduction 
 
In the western world, freedom of contract is one of the axioms of contract law. This 
means that parties are free to enter or not to enter into agreements. In former days 
agreement was based on a very classic as simple model: an agreement is reached at 
the moment that an offer is accepted and that is all. 
 
However, times are changing.  The classic procedure for entering into agreements does not meet 
the requirements posed by the market today anymore. The modern contract making process is 
often a set of very complex agreements and usually involves big amounts of money. The negotia-
tions may last for months or even years. As a result, the parties will reach an agreement by 
piecemeal. There is not a simple offer and an acceptance anymore, but there are offers, counter-
offers, partial agreements etc. etc. and the ultimate agreement is reached only at the end of the 
discussion. But when exactly the discussion is ended? For this still developing contract formation 
procedure, in most legal systems there are no special and adequate rules established. 
 
Since it is impossible to qualify in these cases offer and acceptance, a whole set of new problems 
arises: 
 
1. has the agreement been concluded; 
2. when was it concluded; 
3. if the agreement is concluded, what are the terms of it. 
 
In this paper I will examine and discuss a very controversial topic in the theory of the formation of 
contracts: the relationship between parties in a situation in which an agreement has not been 
reached and one of the parties breaks off the negotiations. This can be done in several ways: one 
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can just end the negotiations and walk away, the offerer can revoke his offer, an option clause is 
violated etc. Since there is still no contractual liability in these cases, the question arises if there is 
any liability at all and if so according to what theory a party is held liable. 
 
I will analyse this problem from the point of view of two legal families: Common Law and Civil 
Law. In the context of this paper by Civil Law I mean the codified law systems in Western Europe 
and I will discuss French, German and Dutch law. We will see that there are important differences 
between the Common Law and the Civil Law approach to these problems. As a result of the still 
growing trade market between the United States and Western Europe it is of utmost importance 
that one is aware of these differences. 
 
I want to discuss three topics: 
 
1. cross-boundary pre-contractual negotiations will bring together law and culture and reality and 
perception and so many problematic situations; I will give you just some examples to show what I 
mean; 
2. then I will discuss the different approaches as mentioned above and even more important the 
different results on what is understand as pre-contractual liability; 
3. the last topic will be on recent European developments in contract law in this field as realized in 
a proposed European Code of Contract Law.    
 
 
2. Law and culture 
 
As I said before, pre-contractual negotiations will not only bring together law and culture but also 
reality and perception. So it is quite possible that one party – from his particular background and 
legal culture – is convinced that after some meetings an agreement is reached, as the opposite 
party thinks these were still preliminary conversations. When this is the case severe problems will 
rise and immediately two questions have to be answered: 
 
1. according to which law the breaking off of the negotiations has to be judged; 
2. and which court has standing. 
 
In Common Law countries, as a rule lawyers will take part in the conversation in a very early 
stage of the negotiations. 
Why? An explanation could be that according to German legal culture – and the same is true for 
The Netherlands - it is all a matter of trust. If you take your lawyers with you from the start of the 
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negotiations it means you don’t trust the other party so they don’t trust you.  The result is that you 
start the negotiations one step behind the other party and that is exactly not what you want. 
 
Probably this is also because English and American contracts are much longer than German, 
French or Dutch contracts.1
 
Just one example; contrast these two standard forms of a forum selection clause: 
• American clause: The exclusive forum for the resolution of any dispute under or arising 
out of this agreement shall be the courts of general jurisdiction of  xxx and both parties 
submit to the jurisdiction of such courts. The parties waive all objections based on forum 
non convenience; 
• German clause: Ausschliesslicher Gerichtsstand ist xxx (the only competent court is xxx) 
(p. 896)   
 
So when you enter into international contracting your first lessons are: 
 
1. be aware of the cultural differences and legal mentality between you and the other party ; 
2. try to reach an agreement on two questions as early in the negotiations as possible: 
a. which law has to be applied in case anything goes wrong (express choice of law); 
b. which court has standing. 
 
A way to realize an answer to these questions in the pre-contractual stage is the use of a so 
called Letter of Intend or a Memorandum of Agreement. In case anything goes wrong, such a Let-
ter or Memorandum can save a lot of time and money for both parties. According to American 
case law the answer of the question if the Letter or Memorandum is legally binding depends on 
the following factors: 
 
- The amount of details; 
- The language used; 
- Are there any escape-clauses; 
- Are there ‘subject to formal contract/definitive agreement’ clauses; 
 
1 See for a comparison between American and German contracts: Claire A. Hill and 
Christopher  King, How do German contracts do as much with fewer words? , 79 Chi-
cago-Kent Law Review 2004, p. 889 – 926. 
 
   
5 
- Contrariety; 
- Complexity of the transaction; 
- The way parties behave in the pre-contractual stage; 
- Custom. 
 
In Civil law similar factors are used. 
 
For about seven years I was honorary judge in the Court of Rotterdam in a division on interna-
tional contracts. In a surprisingly amount of cases – where contracts were actually formed – there 
was no provision on an express choice of law and on which court has standing. Making a choice 
on forehand will save time and money and the following factors can be taken into account. In the 
first place parties create certainty; both parties know what to expect in case anything goes wrong. 
Secondly parties can choose the law which is best applicable in this particular transaction. As to 
the choice which court has standing important factors are the costs and length of a trial and other 
economical factors. 
 
This being said we will discuss the second topic. 
 
3. PRE-ONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN SEVERAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
For a long time the law remained completely silent as to the procedure for contract formation 
through negotiations. In former days the only requirements were offer and acceptance: when the 
offer is accepted the agreement has been reached, as simple as that. This approach was based 
on the so called aleatory theory of the pre-contractual process, which means that each party 
bears its own risks associated with the negotiation: both benefits and losses are treated as being 
at risk in negotiations.   
 
This classical procedure theory is built on three assumptions: 
 
1. any interference will result in the violation of the freedom of contract principle; 
2. any interference will make the parties think twice before embarking on negotiations; 
3. unless the parties are bound by an enforceable agreement, their behavior should be ig-
nored as legally indifferent. 
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However, nowadays modern contract law recognizes negotiations as a separate contract 
formation procedure. A balance has to be found between freedom of contract and the protec-
tion of rights and interests of the parties entering in negotiations. 
 
Because it is almost impossible to work out detailed provisions, only general principles of pre-
contractual behavior can be established. First I will take a short look at the Common Law ap-
proach and then I will discuss several Civil Law systems. 
3.1 COMMON LAW 
 
In this paragraph both English and American law will be compared.  I will take the English ap-
proach as a starting point, because this approach still resembles the classical theory on con-
tract law. 
 
  
3.1.1 ENGLISH LAW 
(Giliker 2002, Cheshire and Fifoot 2001, Allen 1991) 
 
In the case William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. V. Davis [1957] 1 W.L.R. 932, 934 (Q.B. 1957) the 
view is expressed that a party to negotiations ‘… undertakes this work as a gamble, and its 
cost is part of the overhead expense of his business which he hopes will be met out of the 
profits of such contracts as are made.’ 
 
More recently the leading case on this topic is Walford v. Miles [1992] 1 All ER 453. The 
question was if the parties can, by agreement, impose on themselves a duty to negotiate in 
good faith. Lord Ackner held: 
 
‘Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as 
he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if he 
thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further negotiation or to withdraw in fact 
in the hope that the opposite party may seek to reopen negotiations by offering him im-
proved terms. … A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is in-
herently inconsistent with the position of the negotiating party.’ 
 
In spite of this rather rigid and formalistic view English law has taken on this question, there are 
some grounds to pursue negotiations or to recover damages in case of breaking off the negotia-
tions. 
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Although the main contract has not been concluded, the court may held that there is a collateral 
contract which gives rise to some rights during the negotiating process. 
  
And even though there is no contract, a party may be entitled to restitutionary relief on the 
grounds that the other party has derived a benefit from the transaction for which he should com-
pensate the plaintiff even if no contract has arisen (unjust enrichment). 
 
Finally a party can be held liable for loss which he inflicted on the other party in case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation (a claim in tort, e.g. when there was never an intention to form a contract) or 
negligent misrepresentation.  
 
In England one can only claim negative interests. 
 
Specific performance – that is to say forcing parties to re-open negotiations – is not possible. 
 
 
3.1.2 AMERICAN LAW 
(Tanner and Hamilton, paper 2004, Turack 1991) 
 
Like in English contract theory, it is generally agreed that also in the United States the existence 
of a duty in good faith is denied in the absence of an enforceable contract. According to American 
law there are three other grounds for pre-contractual liability. 
 
As in England, unjust enrichment as a basis for liability could be a ground for restitution. How-
ever, just a few courts have entertained such claims and the prevailing view is still the aleatory 
theory: both benefit and loss are at risk of the parties. 
 
Also the misrepresentation theory is considered to be a ground for recovering losses in the pre-
contractual stage in the United States, but situations in which this occurs are quite rare.  
 
The most fruitful basis for recovering pre-contractual damages in American courts is the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel: one negotiating party cannot without liability breach a promise made dur-
ing negotiations, if the other party relied on that promise. Leading case is Hofmann v. Red Owl 
Store (133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965)): 
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‘[A] supermarket chain promised to sell the claimant a franchise, first advising the claim-
ant to sell his bakery, move to another town and open a smaller grocery store as a 
means of gaining experience, and buy a lot the chain had selected for the potential fran-
chise location. The supermarket chain then told the claimant to sell his small grocery 
store, which was operating at a profit, only to break off negotiations for the franchise 
shortly thereafter.’ (Tanner 2004, p. 16) 
 
The court formulates three requirements of promissory estoppel: 
 
1. Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promise? 
2. Did the promise induce such action or forbearance/ 
3. Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promisee? 
 
Than the court held: 
 
‘We deem it would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory estoppel as 
the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action. As Dean Boyer points out, it is desirable 
that fluidity in the application of the concept be maintained. … While the first two of the 
above listed three requirements of promissory etsoppel present issues of fact which ordi-
narily will be resolved by a jury, the third requirement, that the remedy can only be in-
voked where necessary to avoid injustice, is one that involves a policy decision by the 
court. Such a policy decision necessarily embraces an element of discretion. 
We conclude that injustice would result here if plaintiffs were not granted some relief be-
cause of the failure of the defendants to keep their promises which induced plaintiffs to 
act to their detriment.’  
 
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel only negative interests can be recovered, damages 
based on loss of profits is considered inappropriate because etsoppel is not the equivalent of 
breach of contract. 
 
In respect of promissory estoppel American law differs from English law; in English law this doc-
trine in the context of pre-contractual liability is seldom used. 
 
Another difference is that when there is a binding agreement to agree, there is a general obliga-
tion of fair dealing attaches to deal. The same result can be reached by a Letter of Intend: a duty 
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to negotiate in good faith is imposed on the parties when the language of the Letter makes this 
duty clear or when it may be implied by the court if the agreement is silent. 
 
In absence of any of the above mentioned conditions, the core premise of the aleatory view of 
contract adopted by American courts is that a party to pre-contractual negotiations, may break off 
the negotiations at any time and for any reason, including no reason at all, and face no liability.  
 
Recovery based on restitution is measured by the benefit of the party which improperly received 
the idea of services. The measure of damages for misrepresentation is reliance interest, expecta-
tion interest and lost opportunities. The same is true for pre-contractual liability grounded upon 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
 
No case law is available as to the question if an American court would order specific performance 
of either continued negotiations or of entering the envisaged contract. The overall view is, that 
specific performance might not be a realistic sanction in case of a breach of the obligation to ne-
gotiate, because the possibility of success in a forced negotiation will be quite slim. It is most 
likely that in a pre-contractual situation reliance damages are granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3 CONCLUSION ON THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 
 
Up until now English courts have refused to regulate the pre-contractual period, save in excep-
tional circumstances. The most important tool seems to be the theory of unjust enrichment. In 
American law emphasis is on the theory of promissory estoppel as an explanation of pre-
contractual liability. In my opinion the American approach is far more fruitful and satisfying then 
the English, because estoppel can be applied in far more cases then unjust enrichment and is – 
as an equitable remedy – more flexible. 
 
3.2 CIVIL LAW 
 
In this paragraph I will concentrate on the German, French, and Dutch legal system as an illustra-
tion of the way the problem of pre-contractual liability is approached and developed by civil law-
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yers. I will start with the German legal system, because German law can be assumed as the cra-
dle of the doctrine of pre-contractual good faith. 
 
 
3.2.1 GERMAN LAW 
(Lorenz 1991) 
 
In 1861 Rudolph von Jhering introduced the concept of culpa in contrahendo in German law, 
which means fault in pre-contractual negotiations. He divided the grounds for liability into three 
groups: 
 
1. one of the parties appears to be incapable of entering into agreements and should 
have notified the other party thereof; 
2. the agreement cannot be performed; 
3. the will of one or both parties in entering into the agreement is defective. 
 
So a distinction is made here for the first time between pre-contractual liability when the agree-
ment is not concluded (1.) and already has been concluded (2. and 3.). 
 
Because of the shortcomings of early German tort law, the Reichsgericht based an opinion on the 
culpa in contrahendo doctrine as early as 1911.  The facts are as follows: 
 
‘A woman had entered a department store in order to buy a linoleum floor cover. After 
having discussed the matter with an employee she pointed to a pattern in which she was 
primarily interested. When the employee tried to pull out this roll two others which he had 
put aside fell due to his negligence. The customer and her child were badly hit and struck 
to the floor. In view of the ensuing excitement no contract of sale was made.’ (Lorenz 
1991, p. 163-164) 
 
The court construed a pre-contractual relationship between the prospective buyer and the store, 
the content of which is the preparation of the intended contract of sale. On this construction § 278 
BGB – on vicarious liability in contractual relations – had to be applied. As a result the employer 
was held liable for the negligent act committed by the employee in the course of negotiations. 
 
The court had to reason this way, because under German law the employer can avoid liability by 
showing and proving that his employee was well selected, trained and properly supervised (§ 
813). 
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The later Bundesgerichtshof (1944) expended this line of reasoning. It is possible to recover 
damages on the basis of culpa in contrahendo even though one had not entered into contractual 
negotiations when the accident happened (a visitor slipping on a banana skin in a store, BGH 26 
Sept. 1961, NJW 1962, 31). In a following case not the customer but her child slipped on a vege-
table leaf lying on the floor in a department store. The court made a combination of culpa in con-
trahendo with a contract with protective effects towards a third party (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
fűr Dritte, BGR 28 Jan. 1976, BGHZ 66, 51). 
 
For two reasons, the problem of breaking off negotiations appears less significant in German law 
compared to other legal systems. In the first place according to German law an offer is irrevoca-
ble unless this binding effect is excluded (§ 145 BGB): 
 
‘Once negotiations have been ripened into an offer, it solely depends upon the offeree to 
bring about a contract. But if the offeror expressly declares that he does not consider 
himself bound, the other party has little or no reason to rely on the proposed contract and 
to spend money in expectation of it. This is why in German law such revocable offers are 
mostly regarded as mere invitations to deal.’ (Lorenz 1991, p. 166)  
And the second reason is the possibility of a contract to make a contract (Vorvertrag). If a con-
tract is considered as an instrument of self-determination, parties must be free to break off nego-
tiations without any fear of liability. 
 
Nevertheless it is possible to recover damages for breaking off negotiations. According to BGH 
10 July 1970, NJW 1970, 1840 and BGH 12 June 1975, NJW 1975, 1774, ‘[r]eliance damages 
must be paid by a party who in the course of negotiations has made the other party believe that a 
contract will certainly be concluded, but then without good reason or from ulterior motives refuse 
to go ahead.’ (Lorenz 1991, 166) 
 
Recently (2002) this case law is codified in the German Civil Code. § 241 II reads, that when 
there is an obligation between two parties – an obligation is a legal relationship between two or 
more persons, giving on the one hand a right and creating on the other hand a corresponding 
duty – they have to take into account each others rights and interests. And § 311 II add to this, 
that this legal relationship also come into existence when starting pre-contractual negotiations. In 
other words, also in this stage parties have to take into account each others rights and interests.  
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In this way the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo is now part of the Civil Code. According to Ger-
man law as it is now, the basis for pre-contractual liability is to be found in the above mentioned 
code provisions.  
One can recover for negative interests only and specific performance is not possible. 
 
 
3.2.2 FRENCH LAW 
(Giliker 2002, Schmidt-Szalewski 1991) 
 
Although France has also a codified law system and so has its own Civil Code, this Code does 
not provide any rules as to the mechanism of negotiations and conclusions of contracts. Point of 
departure is that as long as there is no contract compensation of damages in the pre-contractual 
stage may only be treated in torts. The theory of culpa in contrahendo is rejected in French case 
law. 
 
The French author Saleilles suggested as early as in 1907 to apply the ‘fair conduct’ or good faith 
principle to the entire pre-contractual process (6 RTDC 1907, p. 697). Nevertheless it will take to 
1972 before the Cour de cassation (the French Supreme Court) allows a claim on recovering 
damages for breaking off negotiations. 
 
 So a party suffering loss must turn to art. 1382 CC and following. Art. 1382 CC reads: 
 
‘Any act which causes harm to another obliges the person whose fault caused the harm 
to make reparation.’ (Giliker 2002, p. 120) 
 
French Courts accept that negotiations in the pre-contractual stage involve a period of risk and 
they adhere to the aleatory theory. They want not to exceedingly hamper the freedom of contract, 
especially in business relations. So one Court dismissed an action for damages on the grounds 
that 
 
‘… it would amount to a serious injury towards individual freedom and business security if 
one could be easily liable for breach of negotiations and dealing with a competitor; the 
pre-contractual fault must, in other words, be obvious and undisputable.’ 
(Pau, 14 jan. 1969, D. 1969, p. 716) (1991, p. 150) 
 
But at that point intervention by the law is necessary to impose certain duties of good conduct 
(fairness and good faith) on the parties. Leading case is a decision of de Cour de cassation in 
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1972 (Cass com 20.3.1972 JCP 1973 II 17543). Between the claimant and the executive distribu-
tor in France of American-made machines for the manufacture of cement pipes intensive negotia-
tions had taken place. In this period the claimant had visited the United States to observe the op-
eration of those machines at considerable expense. Also he had attempted to ascertain further 
information, which the distributor was later found to have withheld. Than followed a sudden termi-
nation of all discussion: just a short phone-call. A contract was made with the claimant’s competi-
tor. According to a clause in that contract the distributor would not supply a similar machine in 
that region for the following 42 months. 
The Cour de cassation found such conduct to invoke delictual liability. 
 
Since this case a lot of other cases followed in the years after. Just one more citation of the Court 
of Appeal of Riom (10.6.1992 RJDA 1992, No 893, p. 732) on freedom of contract: 
 
‘If freedom [of contract] is the main principle in the pre-contractual period and includes 
the freedom to break off the negotiations at any time, it is still true that when the latter 
have reached a length and a level of intensity such that one party may legitimately be-
lieve that the other is about to conclude the contract and in readiness encourages him to 
incur certain expenses, breaking off such negotiations is wrong, causes loss and gives 
rise to reparation.’  
(Giliker 2002, p. 124) 
 
In a recent case the Cour de cassation ( Com 7.4.1998 D 1999.514) highlights the factors influ-
encing the decision of the courts: 
- the advanced stage of negotiations; 
- the work already undertaken; 
- the suddenness of withdrawal from the negotiating process. (Giliker 2002, p. 125) 
 
A last remark on French law. According to French law it is not possible to recover for loss of profit 
for the same reason as used in the American Red Owl-case mentioned before: that would treat 
negotiations as equivalent to contract. 
 
It is hard to say what exactly is the basis for pre-contractual liability in French law. A number of 
cases suggest a basis of good faith dealing but certainly not all. According to Schmidt-Szalewsky 
liability will be imposed where the defendant has undermined a relationship of trust between the 
parties. A last theory is that liability is based on the concept of abus de droit (abuse of right). 
In any case, all these theories are based on liability in tort. 
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Whatever the basis is, French case law shows that the concept of freedom of contract is more 
and more caved in by other concepts to impose certain duties of good conduct on the parties. 
 
 
3.2.3 DUTCH LAW 
(Van Beukering-Rosmuller 2004, Wessels 2003, Van Dunné 1991) 
 
The new Dutch Civil Code of 1992 has no provision on pre-contractual liability. Although a provi-
sion was formulated, the legislator refused to incorporate it into the Code.  The development of 
this doctrine was left over to the courts. 
 
The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad = HR) held in a case in 1957 (Baris – Riezenkamp, HR 
15 nov. 1957, NJ 1958, 67) that parties in negotiations take part in a ‘legal relation ruled by the 
principle of good faith’. The consequence of this view is that parties have to take into account the 
‘justified interests of the other party.’ As a result the court came to the formulation of a ‘duty of 
care’; in this case the duty for the buyer to investigate the facts of the subject of contract. Just a 
few years later the court formulated a similar duty for the seller to disclose material facts to the 
buyer in the course of negotiations (Booy – Wisman, HR 21 jan. 1966, NJ 1966, 183). In these 
cases the contracts were actually formed already and this principle of good faith in the pre-
contractual stage was formulated in the context of the doctrine of misrepresentation. 
 
These developments in case law were the beginning of reconsidering the law in a second situa-
tion where no contract was concluded at all between the parties, especially in cases of breaking 
off the negotiations. The first and still leading case in this field is Plas – Valburg2.  Construction 
firm Plas tendered for the building of a municipal swimming pool in the town of Valburg. The 
mayor and his aldermen agreed to the plans, but their decision still had to get approval from the 
City Council. A member of the Council took the initiative for an alternative tender and this resulted 
in a lower price. As a result Plas was set aside and he claimed for damages. In this landmark de-
cision the court makes a distinction between three stages in the negotiating process: 
 
1. the initial stage: parties are free to break off negotiations without any obligation to com-
pensate the other party; 
2. the continuing stage: a party may be free to break off negotiations, but at this stage he is 
under the obligation to compensate the other party for expenses incurred; 
 
2 (HR 18 June 1982, NJ 1983, 723) 
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3. the final stage: a party is not allowed to break off the negotiations because this would be 
against good faith; violation of this obligation not only gives rise to compensate the nega-
tive interests of the other party, but also – if deemed appropriate – the positive interests, 
in other words the profits that would have    
 
A following step was made by the Supreme Court in 1983: when a party is unwilling to continue 
negotiations, there may be nevertheless a legal obligation to do so and the unwilling party may be 
forced by the court to negotiate.3  
The result of this development of the case law is that the freedom to break off negotiations may 
be barred on the ground of the justified reliance on the side of the other party that a contract will 
be concluded or in consideration of other circumstances of the case. Specific performance of 
such obligations may be granted by the court with the use of a recognizance. 
 
As far as I know only in Dutch law it is possible to force parties to re-open negotiations; this de-
velopment in law is unique in the world. 
 
In Dutch law it is hard to explain on what theory pre-contractual liability is based. There are two 
doctrines: tortuous liability or the doctrine of good faith. Last mentioned doctrine is neither based 
on contract or tort. The pre-contractual stage seems to have a status of its own. 
 
 
4. PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW  
 
In the Introduction to the Principles of European Contract Law one can read: 
 
‘In some respects the Principles may be compared with the American Restatement of the 
Law of Contract, which was published in its second edition in 1981.Like the Restatements 
the articles drafted are supplied with comments and notes. The Restatements consist of 
non-binding rules, "soft law". They purport to restate the Common Law of the United 
States. The Principles are also "soft law", but their main purpose is to serve as a first 
draft of a part of a European Civil Code. Furthermore a common law does not to exist in 
the European Union. The Principles has therefore been established by a more radical 
 
3 HR 11 March 1983, NJ 1983, 585. See also Du Mee – Vestdijk and others, Court of 
Appeal of Amsterdam, 7 May 1987, NJ 1988, 635).   
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process. No single legal system has been their basis. The Commission has paid attention 
to all the systems of the Member States, but not every of them has had influence on 
every issue dealt with. The rules of the legal systems outside of the Communities have 
also been considered. So have the American Restatement on the Law of Contracts and 
the existing conventions, such as The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sales of Goods (CISG). Some of the Principles reflect ideas which have not 
yet materialised in the law of any state. In short, the Commission has tried to establish 
those principles which it believed to be best under the existing economic and social con-
ditions in Europe.’ 
 
 
Section 3 of the Principles is on liability for negotiations. Article 2:301 reads: 
 
Negotiations Contrary to Good Faith 
 
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement. 
(2) However, a party who has negotiated or broken off negotiations contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the other party. 
(3) It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to enter into or 
continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an agreement with the 
other party. 
 
 
This article may be assumed as a summery of Civil Law on the liability of breaking oof negotia-
tions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION ON THE CIVIL LAW APPROACH IN COMPARISON WITH THE 
COMMON LAW 
 
In the Common Law pre-contractual liability is imposed and based upon specific contract theories 
as restitution, misrepresentation and promissory estoppel. In Civil Law there are many ways to 
incorporate a duty of acting in good faith in the pre-contractual stage. In France it is based on tort 
law, in Germany on the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo - which seems to be an extension of 
contract law - and now codified in the Civil Code and in The Netherlands on tort law or on pre-
contractual good faith as a standard on its own. 
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Except for the Netherlands, in all other legal systems in this research one cannot recover but for 
negative interests. The Dutch legal system goes two steps further: 
- one can recover positive damages as well; 
- the court can force a party to re-open the negotiations. 
 
The overall conclusion is, that there are substantial more possibilities to recover damages in 
cases of pre-contractual liability in the codified law systems discussed above, than in Common 
Law countries. 
 
